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Review
Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary
Richard A. Posner. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2016. 432pp.

Paul E. McGreal *

In Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary, Judge Richard Posner proposes a
partnership between the federal judiciary and law schools.1 He provides a sweeping
critique of the federal judiciary and suggests ways in which law schools can address these
failings. His critiques fall under the headings of structural deformations (e.g., method of
appointment, lifetime tenure), process deficiencies, (e.g., legal formalism in judicial
opinion writing, lack of curiosity), and management deficiencies (e.g., poor staff
management, lack of collegiality). The corresponding solutions include law schools
providing continuing education for federal judges and changing their curricula to include
new knowledge and skills. It is an ambitious and comprehensive volume on improving
the federal judiciary.
Judge Posner’s full catalogue of failings and prescriptions will surely receive
treatment in multiple forums, as it should. In this review, I focus on a single criticism of
judicial behavior: that a judge’s decision is often affected by what Judge Posner calls
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“priors.” He suggests a course of continuing judicial education as a remedy for this
problem, which surely has merit. I provide brief commentary on his suggested approach.
Judge Posner criticizes federal judges for lacking self-knowledge of the “priors”
that inappropriately affect their written opinions and decisions (165). As he uses the term,
a “prior is a belief or inclination, conscious or (frequently) unconscious, that one brings
to an issue before obtaining any evidence concerning it” (17).2 He observes that
“[j]udges, like most people, tend to not know themselves very well” (350), and he warns
that this lack of self-awareness leaves judges “excessively self-confident” in a way that
inevitably affects the process and outcome of their work. For example, a judge may be
disposed against a type of litigant based on their occupation, wealth, or other
characteristic, which results in harsh judicial language towards or an unfavorable decision
for the litigant.
Because unconscious priors add an irrelevant factor into the decision making
process, they implicate the guarantee of fairness that underlies the constitutional
requirement of “due process.” These priors do not rise to the level of unconstitutional
judicial bias, as the Supreme Court has set a high hurdle for litigants challenging a
judicial decision on that ground.3 Nonetheless, a government committed to the rule of law
should seek to minimize these influences on the judicial process. And so it is important to
consider how judges might increase awareness of their unconscious priors.
Judge Posner proposes addressing judicial priors through “continuing judicial
education [on] the psychology of judicial decision making” (350). For example, “[a]
course in the psychology of values, preferences, and personality, focusing on judicial
self-deception—bound to be a humbling and eye-opening experience for many of the
judge students—would be of value to the judiciary and the nation” (351). He sees this
education as something that “judges need” regardless of whether they had earlier been
exposed to it in law school (351).
I endorse Judge Posner’s proposal of promoting self-awareness among federal
judges. Indeed, this competency is one from which all adults would benefit. It is no
surprise, then, that some law schools have introduced this competency to their curricula
under the headings of “mindfulness”4 and “emotional intelligence.”5 The goal is for law
students to build a practice of self-reflection that raises self-awareness of their emotions
and other influences that shape their decisions and actions, and then to self-regulate their
behavior as students and (later) attorneys. If law schools are actively discussing these
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competencies, then such continuing judicial education can be developed, if not easily
implemented.
My caveat to Judge Posner’s proposal for continuing judicial education is to not
take a one-size-fits-all approach. I am reminded of the debate over which physical
exercise is best for one’s health. While various forms of physical activity have differing
effects on calories burned, metabolism, and cardiovascular fitness, the most sage advice I
have heard is, “The best exercise is one that you will do.”6 So while the proposal to
provide continuing judicial education is salutary, the precise path to self-awareness may
depend on the person.7 And this is because self-awareness, to be useful, must be an
ongoing practice, and not merely the outcome of a single course or workshop. Just as
physical exercise must become a habit or lifestyle to provide ongoing benefit, selfawareness will come from a regular practice of reflection that provides ongoing
attentiveness to one’s emotions and other influence, understanding of the pushes and
pulls of these priors, and then a commitment to act appropriately. If a lawyer develops
this practice early in their career, it will follow them to the bench.

NOTES
1. Judge Posner specifically notes that his analysis is directed to federal judges and socalled elite law schools. While his discussion is relevant to state court judges and
non-elite law schools, he acknowledges that his account will not apply in all respects
to other judicial and academic institutions.
2.

These priors include “political ideology, religion, and other sources of values
including moral values, temperament, personal and professional experiences,
ambition, culture, generation, family history, ethnic or racial background, gender,
age, education, technical knowledge, cultural breadth, analytical ability, empathy,
sympathy, energy, health” (165–66).

3. A judge’s decision making has been constitutionally compromised only when the risk
of judicial bias “’is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” Caperton v. A. T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. 868, 872 (2009).
4. Leonard L. Riskin, “The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of
Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients,” 7 Harv.
Negot. L. Rev. 1, (2002).
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5. William S. Blatta, “What’s Special About Meditation? Contemplative Practice for
American Lawyers,” 7 Harv. Nego. L. Rev. 125 (2002).
6. Freakonomics Podcast, “What’s the “Best” Exercise?” Jan. 2, 2014, transcript
available at: http://freakonomics.com/2014/01/02/whats-the-best-exercise-fulltranscript/.
7. Some professionals address unconscious priors through spiritual practices. For
example, at Creighton University, which is the Catholic, Jesuit institution where I
work, one can engage spiritual practices called The Spiritual Exercises and the daily
Examen for ongoing self-awareness. See Chris Lowney, Heroic Leadership (2005).

